

National Intelligence Council

NIC 2200_85 23 October 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Robert M. Gates

Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM:

MG David W. Einsel, Jr.

National Intelligence Officer at Large

Dr. Julian Nall

National Intelligence Officer for Science & Technology

SUBJECT:

Chemical Weapons Treaty Compliance Seminar

- 1. Recently a workshop was held at the National Academy of Sciences to identify the procedures and methods, as well as the research required for verification of compliance to a proposed Chemical Weapons Treaty. The workshop dealt with availability of monitoring systems and technologic solutions to problems identified during the meeting and improvements that could be accomplished in the next few years. Included in the workshop were scenarios which detailed information concerning Treaty compliance verification situations, including declared CW stocks, production plants, on-site inspections, demilitarization of CW stockpiles, movement of CW components, training exercises, commercial chemical production and actual use of chemical weapons. For each of these scenarios the workshop tried to define the hardware/equipment that could help to form solutions to specific problems.
- 2. The key judgments from the workshop indicated that verification of a chemical treaty will be more difficult than current procedures that are used to monitor the nuclear treaty and the US does not have the necessary hardware to meet current or projected verification needs. An R&D program will take from three to eight years to produce and fully demonstrate detection and sensor capabilities suitable for treaty monitoring. As important, is the judgment that today compliance with a treaty is virtually unverifiable in areas of undeclared stocks, clandestine production and new agent programs.

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3. The workshop also pointed out that intelligence collection and analysis will be critical in the next few years to the extent of providing information on the locations of production facilities, storage locations, stockpile size, training exercises and testing of new agents at the same time as the community establishes the feasibility and manufacture of technical means to detect noncompliance.

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4. As part of an Intelligence Community awareness program we will be sponsoring a seminar on Conceptual Systems for CW Treaty Monitoring. It will include a series of briefings and discussions on verification issues, future technical collectors and concepts on sampling hardware. We hope this will make intelligence analysts cognizant of developing procedural and technical options needed in treaty monitoring. The seminar will be co-hosted by the A/NIO/S&T, and A/NIO/CBW,

and will have attendance from WSSIC and STIC subcommittees. It

will be held in CIA Headquarters on 6 December 1985.

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